Democratising smart cities? Penta-helix multistakeholder social innovation framework by Calzada, Igor
smart cities
Article
Democratising Smart Cities? Penta-Helix
Multistakeholder Social Innovation Framework
Igor Calzada 1,2
1 Urban Transformations ESRC & Future of Cities Programmes, COMPAS, University of Oxford,
58 Banbury Road, Oxford OX2 6QS, UK; igor.calzada@compas.ox.ac.uk; Tel.: +44-7887-661925
2 Digital Economy Unit & Centre for Advanced Studies (CAS), DG Joint Research Centre (JRC),
European Commission, Via Fermi 2749, 21027 Ispra, Italy
Received: 8 September 2020; Accepted: 28 September 2020; Published: 6 October 2020


Abstract: The smart cities policy approach has been intensively implemented in European cities under
the Horizon 2020 programme. However, these implementations not only reduce the interdependencies
among stakeholders to technocratic Public-Private-Partnership (PPP) models, but also fail to
question the identities of strategic stakeholders and how they prioritise their business/social models.
These aspects are putting democracy at stake in smart cities. Therefore, this article aims to unfold
and operationalise multistakeholders’ policy frameworks from the social innovation perspective by
suggesting the ex-novo penta-helix framework—including public, private, academia, civic society,
and social entrepreneurs/activists—to extend the triple and quadruple-helix frameworks. Based on
fieldwork action research conducted from February 2017 to December 2018—triangulating desk
research, 75 interviews, and three validation workshops—this article applies the penta-helix framework
to map out five strategic dimensions related to (i) multistakeholder helix framework and (ii) the
resulting business/social models comparatively in three follower cities of the H2020-Replicate project:
Essen (Germany), Lausanne (Switzerland), and Nilüfer (Turkey). For each case study, the findings
reveal: (i) a unique multistakeholder composition, (ii) diverse preferences on business/social models,
(iii) a regular presence of the fifth helix as intermediaries, and (iv) the willingness to experiment with
democratic arrangements beyond the hegemonic PPP.
Keywords: smart cities; social innovation; penta-helix; multistakeholder; H2020; Europe; democracy;
PPP; action research; fieldwork
1. Introduction: Democratising the Technocratic Smart City
Smartness in cities cannot be more technocratic than democratic [1]. Albeit over recent years,
smart city has become eminently a mainstream technocratic concept in European policy agendas [2,3].
These agendas, in turn, have taken for granted the meaning of stakeholders without further questioning
who the term actually references, which puts at stake both urban democracy and the related political
decisions for the city [4–9].
In addition, increasingly autonomous and invisible algorithms have made it even harder for city
authorities to detect and scrutinise their impartiality status, resulting in a technocratic governance
push of the smart city [10,11]. Kitchin [12] (p. 9) defines technocratic governance as the procedure
by which “all aspects of a city can be measured and monitored and treated as technical problems
that can be addressed through technical solutions.” Thus, the aggregated use of digital data to
monitor, surveil, and nudge citizens has resulted in an intrinsic version of the technocratic smart
city [13–15], which pervasively bypasses the democratic accountability to which stakeholders are
entitled. Despite these negative side effects, smart cities have remained the focus of urban policy
and decision-makers worldwide, as a broad rubric for using the so-called stakeholder and citizen
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engagement practices orientated towards the management in such techno-deterministic—and more
bluntly, less democratic—and, thus, further platformised urban realms [16–18].
Against this backdrop, the smart cities policy approach has been intensively implemented in
several European cities under the policy umbrella of the H2020-Smart Cities and Communities
(H2020-SCC) framework funded by the European Commission [19–25]. Particularly since 2015,
17 lighthouse projects—involving 46 lighthouses and 71 follower cities—have been laying out
the European H2020-SCC policy scheme [26]. These lighthouse projects, according to the related
institutional discourse, aim to deliver smart technologies to municipalities by demonstrating that
technologies on energy, mobility, and ICT can be a cost-effective way to tackle some of the most
profound social, political, democratic, economic, institutional, and environmental issues that current
and future generations are likely to face.
Nonetheless, until very recently, the hegemonic policy discourse in the European H2020-SCC
policy scheme has been reduced to the economic value it generates through technocratic partnerships
with powerful public and private actors: Public-Private-Partnerships (PPP) [27–33]. Beyond these
cost-effective PPP models [27,32], which stem from the institutional discourse, little has been questioned
about the strategic stakeholders who have been formulating, uniquely and contextually, the smart city
priorities [31,34,35]. In fact, the European Commission, as part of its European Innovation Partnerships
(EIPs) in H2020-SCC, encourages cities, industries, SMEs, and communities—without clarifying which
stakeholders constitute these communities and what role they play—to come together to form an
alliance consequential enough to build inclusive citizen-focused smart cities [36].
According to Harvey [37] (p. 2), “smart city and the new urbanism movements build an image
of the community and a rhetoric of place-based civic pride and consciousness for those who do not
need it, while abandoning others in need to their underclass fate.” This statement intertwines with
the criticism on the technocratic European smart city model initially advocated by the European
Commission’s H2020-SCC policy scheme [38–41]. Through the scheme, the democratic representation
of stakeholders is reduced to being labelled as “citizen-focused smart cities rooted in pragmatic,
instrumental, and paternalistic discourses and practices rather than those of social rights, political
citizenship, and the common good” [42] (p. 1).
Furthermore, the perspective of an increase in the already remarkable amount of data being
controlled by artificial intelligence tools and devices owned by multinational corporations may further
exacerbate already pervasive social inequalities, marginalising the most voiceless and vulnerable
stakeholders in smart cities [43–46]. This reality has aggravated the already controversial technocratic
smart city model and the related debate, raising questions about who benefits and makes such
political determinations.
Thus, the point of departure and the aim of this article is the willingness to illuminate and clarify
the methodological discussion on the helix frameworks from the Social Innovation (SI) perspective
via extending the triple and quadruple-helix frameworks by suggesting an evidence-based ex-novo
framework called penta-helix [47–52]. Penta-helix defines as a joint interaction of the four established
helixes of the so-called quadruple-helix (the public sector, the private sector, academia, and civic society)
being intermediated and activated by the fifth helix (social entrepreneurs/activists). Accordingly,
this article operationally responds to two intertwined research questions related to the democratic
representation and the varied power relations among stakeholders: First, how can we map out,
comparatively in three cities, the composition of a multistakeholder policy framework based on SI (and
the resulting business/social models), particularly enhancing the existing triple- and quadruple-helix
frameworks. Second, consequently, how can we further incorporate the dynamic and transformational
aspect in smart cities through intermediaries as collaborative capacity builders and the essential
transformational agency for SI to occur [53].
In an attempt to shed light on these two research questions, this article operationalises the
penta-helix framework and explores research avenues on how to further approach broad democratic
representation and agency in smart cities. The article, in doing so, aims to unfold the unique
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multistakeholder composition through five strategic dimensions, by comparing three follower
cities of the Replicate H2020-SCC project—Essen (Germany), Lausanne (Switzerland), and Nilüfer
(Turkey)—based on the results gathered through intensive action research fieldwork undertaken
from February 2017 to December 2018. The three follower cities aimed to look into replicating
interventions in their cities [54]. The methodology ensured (i) the inclusion of the widest diversity of
potential strategic stakeholders in each city that regularly, actively, and democratically engaged in the
formulations of smart city priorities and, consequently, (ii) the mapping out of the multistakeholder
policy framework using the penta-helix. The assumption lies in the idea that the broader a composition
of stakeholders in a given smart city, the better democratic representation the smart city intervention may
achieve. This article presents the empirical results obtained by conducting triangulation methodology
in three European cities through three intertwined action research techniques deployed in each
case: (i) desk research, (ii) 25 in-depth interviews, and (iii) one validation workshop encompassing
25 strategic stakeholders.
The article is structured as follows: The next section presents the literature review of SI,
the third section discusses the methodology of the penta-helix carried out in the three case studies,
and the fourth section compares and examines the empirical results. The final section concludes with
the main results and offers an array of research avenues to continue exploring how SI may enhance the
democratisation in smart cities [55].
2. Literature Review: Social Innovation (SI) Perspective
2.1. Social Innovation (SI)
Despite the abundant literature about SI, the notion may be blurred too much in the current policy
debate [56–73]. As Mihci [74] (p. 18) highlights, insofar as “many theoretical approaches, ideas and
practices labelled under the category of SI have relatively little in common”, such a vagueness and
fuzziness might make the intervention process even more complex and challenging.
In this article, though, SI—defined as the capacity to elaborate alternative discourses and actions
that are counter-hegemonic in terms of resistance and/or innovative transformations—plays an
important role by generating the intermediation conditions for further democratic decision-making
processes for urban and technological adoptions in smart cities [75,76]. SI, thus, offers a critique of
the dominance of market-based logics (also embodied through PPP) and data extractivism in the
age of liberalism [77], which consequently opens up a promising field of research to revisit helix
frameworks that enable intermediation conditions among stakeholders to better achieve a democratic
representation of varied power relations [78]. Moreover, according to Moulaert and MacCallum [64] SI
revolves around “the idea that society’s capacity to attend to human needs is founded on connecting
people in ways that promote understanding, reciprocity, and cooperation—that is, on creating the
conditions for collective action” (p. 3). Intermediation conditions for collective action as this article
shows with a penta-helix multistakeholder SI framework.
Nonetheless, despite that these intermediation conditions need to be thoroughly prepared by
incorporating a wider range of stakeholders operating in diverse domains or helixes, it cannot be
expected that only incorporating several diverse (even marginal) actors to the socio-political game of
the smart city will generate a democratic outcome [43]. In fact, SI suggests mediation and translation
between network actors or helixes [75], which may have different interests and understandings of
the same urban issues and domains [37]. In this direction, recent projects, such as Smart Urban
Intermediaries [53], are exploring this path—complementing the active role of social entrepreneurs and
activists in local neighbourhoods as an integral part of stimulating civic society in cross-fertilisation
with the public sector, the private sector, and even sometimes academia.
Given the current multistakeholder dynamics in regional innovation systems occurring in European
cities and regions under the policy scheme of H2020-SCC, this article argues that transformative
alliances among the public sector, private sector, academia, and civic society are increasingly
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including—consciously but also sometimes unwittingly—the emerging fifth helix. The fifth helix
is embodied by social entrepreneurs and activists—who play the role of intermediaries, bricoleurs,
brokers, and/or assemblers—acting as the main driver of change and, most importantly, operating
in the borders by connecting the four entities encompassing the quadruple-helix as pollinisers and
cross-sectoral ambassadors [79]. Hence, this article—by applying the penta-helix framework to a
comparative study—suggests that the triple-helix [80] alone cannot sufficiently activate unpredictable
and experimental dynamics owing to the fixed and technocratic nature of the interplay among
stakeholders, nor can the quadruple-helix [81] leverage any intrinsic transformational reaction by itself
since it is based on an institutionalised bottom-up process where citizens might react passively to
suggested initiatives.
However, acknowledging the novelty and the early stage of this scientific approach, and that helix
frameworks methodologically only represent ideal types [82], this article considers that further research
is required to explore the profiles, motivations, modes of interaction, and transformative conditions
of such intermediation produced by the fifth helix. This article applies the proposed penta-helix
framework—preliminarily introduced in previous publications by the author [52]—to the three
aforementioned city cases in order to operationalise SI through helix frameworks, which essentially
result in a diverse set of business/social models. By opening up a plethora of potential interactions
among diverse stakeholders, this article suggests that cities may be willing to further experiment with
adopting one or another business/social model, without necessarily reducing the chances to create
hegemonic PPPs.
Thus, to methodologically operationalise stakeholders among helix frameworks and the related
interactions among them that result in a diverse set of business/social models—albeit avoiding
normative determinism on further assumptions—this section presents two intertwined literature
reviews stemming from SI by focusing on the intermediation that enables the penta-helix framework
conditions. The first subsection revolves around the literature on rethinking multistakeholder helix
frameworks by exploring the potential features of triple-, quadruple-, and penta-helix frameworks
based on the notion of the urban commons, particularly through data commons as an updated timely
trend in several smart cities [83,84]. The second subsection examines the literature on the resulting five
business/social models that stem from the multistakeholder helix frameworks.
2.2. Rethinking Multistakeholder Helix Frameworks from the SI Perspective: Triple-, Quadruple-,
and Penta-Helix
The triple-helix framework was developed to conceptualise public innovation and the flow
of knowledge in open innovation systems [85]. Initially focused on technological innovation that
benefits economic development, the triple-helix framework was useful for the interconnectedness
among universities, industry, and government [76]. In those days, it could be seen as an almost
disruptive idea. Soon, however, the institutional arrangements established in the name of the triple-helix
became more separated and conventional. The inventions were supposed to be generated in what
has been called the knowledge infrastructure (universities), developed through the support structure
(usually tax-financed incubators), and finally commercialised in the production structure (private
sector as business-as-usual). Several authors theorised the triple-helix as the framework (made up of
private/industry, public/government, and academia/university) that enabled researchers to study the
knowledge base of an urban economy [86–90].
However, neither dynamic and pervasive SI processes nor civic society as an entity or helix
were included in this analysis, insofar as the definition of smart city governance only considered
the fixed structure fuelled “by academia, industry, and government” [91] (p. 7). The definition also
excluded methodologically civic society (quadruple-helix) and further omitted the assemblage role
that social entrepreneurs and activists (penta-helix) may play towards further democratic notions
of smart cities. In addition, Deakin [91] (p. 1) considers the triple-helix framework sufficient to
“cultivate the environmental capacity, ecology, and vitality of those spaces which the direct democracy
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of their participatory governance opens up, add value to and construct.” On the other hand, this article
emphasises the necessary connections among stakeholders through the active role of the pervasive
fifth helix between social entrepreneurship/activists in the policy experimentation process by avoiding
narrow interpretations under the banner of SI [70]. Paradoxically, though, if wrongly employed, SI can
seemingly even reinforce ongoing dynamics of welfare state retrenchment instead of its re-activation
by reducing the scope to enhance the position of SI as a better placed paradigm to develop sustainable
responses to contemporary societal challenges, compared to free-market solutions [92] and to neoliberal
governing strategies [93] usually embedded in the so-called PPP.
By acknowledging the limited scope of the triple-helix framework [76,94], Goddard and
Kempton [95] describe the quadruple-helix framework as a partnership convened by universities as key
civic institutions to shape the future development of their cities. They suggest that global knowledge
locked up in universities could be mobilised to anchor the university locally in the city by using urban
foresight methodologies. In essence, this approach challenges the traditional linear models of science
and technology push approach to city development through research commercialisation, which has
been embraced by governments through the support of triple-helix partnerships between the state,
universities, and businesses and the creation of urban science parks [88,96]. Thus, the ‘civic university’
is suggested as contrasting the traditional university, insofar as there are strong overlaps between the
three domains of teaching, research, and societal engagement and the adoption of a holistic view of city
development. Hence, the quadruple-helix framework might include diverse ways that citizens and
stakeholders can actually benefit from recent developments in urban technologies [97]. Nonetheless,
the quadruple-helix framework has sometimes revealed that the initiatives are pushed by institutions,
resulting in poor or even inexistent social mobilisation [98–101].
Furthermore, neither the triple- nor the quadruple-helix frameworks can explain the articulation
of a deeper transformational democratic disruption entirely led and governed by an intermediated
collective intelligence. In such frameworks, beside market creation and competitiveness imperatives,
little is left for experimenting among entrepreneurial co-operative networks of individuals and civic
groups [102,103]. This fact could be seen as a systemic innovative spark towards tackling the lack of
political engagement and democratic representation. The penta-helix framework, thus, suggests the
fifth helix, an assemblage, being diluted in the other four helixes while claiming the need to expand
the understanding of the data-driven smart city and focusing on the identification of the urban assets
as data with full consideration now as a public good or as data commons [84].
Inevitably, the penta-helix framework resonates with the narratives of the urban commons [104],
which has recently been reinterpreted, most importantly, in the aftermath of the algorithmic disruptive
tsunami, as data commons [83,84], in which data is seen as a common infrastructure beyond the
PPP hegemony. Regarding data commons, Bollier [105] suggests that citizens could retain control
of data related to the smart services that matter to them, instead of data related to businesses or
bureaucracy. The data commons, thus, go beyond state-market solutions by asking whether another
type of city is possible—that is, a third way between the state and the market, a city not dominated
by the PPP. Unsurprisingly, then, a techno-political debate appears to be gathering around theses
ever-more-frequent conflicts that lack an adequate response in the traditional market–state dichotomy.
A nondeterministic way to start exploring new socially innovative outcomes could be a transition
from the triple- and quadruple-helixes to the penta-helix, in order to enhance the scope for resulting
business/social models among stakeholders.
In addition, data-driven sensitive urban environments require the valuable role of intermediaries
such as social entrepreneurs and activists [16] (i.e., transformers or bricoleurs). Ultimately, it is essential
to bring back the social ties that modern hyper-connected societies have dramatically weakened
through the spread of data-rich fragmented environments [106]. Therefore, it is vital to rethink
multistakeholder helix strategies by ensuring the complete democratic representation of diverse voices
from each helix. This representation would reflect a wide range of voices in a community without
relegating any to institutional settings, yet it cannot occur while taking for granted the valuable roles of
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proactive stakeholders, who set up new collective connections based on the interplay among a diverse
set of interests, imaginaries, and practices [76,107–109].
Hence, the inclusion of the fifth helix, broadly understood as those agents playing the role of
transformational intermediaries (i.e., brokers or assemblers) in pursuit of social entrepreneurship [36]
and activism, connects directly to these early adopters with an ethical and socio-political awareness
of social justice and democracy. The penta-helix (shown in Figure 1), in contrast to the institutional
structuralist triple- and quadruple-helix, is novel as its contribution includes social entrepreneurs,
activists, assemblers, or bricoleurs as an additional helix, which emphasises the active role of citizenship
as an agency of systemic, bottom-up, and disruptive SI [110]. This fifth helix is the key driver not
only to transform and democratise the smart city concept, but also to experiment across institutional
boundaries in search of the urban commons [111].
Figure 1. Penta-helix multistakeholder framework.
As a result of the triangulation fieldwork action research conducted, this article suggests the
penta-helix framework for considering people and/or organisations as playing the key role of connecting
the entities of the quadruple-helix by fulfilling the following functions: (i) transfer, receive, and integrate
knowledge across helixes in a network; (ii) bring across networks; (iii) nurture the ability to cooperate
among stakeholders by gaining support of leadership, structuring transformative alliances, and
working under different jurisdictions; (iv) act as ‘network builders’ by bringing together resources,
users, and developers; (v) behave as global carriers of best practices, standards, and institutionalised
learning such as lobbying, which are informed by, and in turn inform, concrete local and regional
projects; and (vi) ultimately, recognise plural visions by working out societal challenges (Table 1).
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2.3. Resulting Business/Social Models in Smart Cities
In order to operationalise the multistakeholder framework analysis, the conducted research in the
three Replicate follower cities—which allow for identifying the strategic priorities by a selected number
of strategic stakeholders in each city—links up the composition of stakeholders with the resulting
business/social models.
This article defines business/social models as the resulting and collective preferences made by the
strategic stakeholders—selected by the city representative—of how a city should create economic and
social value collectively through the development of urban innovative services that are technically
feasible and democratically desirable, while reducing the city’s overall environmental footprint.
This research acknowledges, though a potential uncertain precondition and ideological bias exist,
that a democratic smart city can only be built as long as the strategic stakeholders selected by the
city representative in charge of coordinating the smart city strategic formulation are democratically
nominated with enough public scrutiny and transparency.
This article operationalises five business/social models (Table 2) stemming from the literature
review of the multistakeholder helix policy framework analysis (Table 1). Yet, these classifications
(Table 1 on helixes and Table 2 on models, respectively) are neither prescriptive, normative, nor
deterministic in essence; instead, these typologies co-exist with each other within a single city’s urban
environmental strategy [82]. The potential of these business/social model typologies is to present their
evolution by reaching (and thus testing) the widest version (the penta-helix framework) comparatively
in three European cities. This premise is a methodological position rather than a normative prescription:
amid the penta-helix framework, several business/social models can co-exist in smart city sectors
(energy, mobility, and ICT; 5th Strategic Dimension) in different cities, as it will be observed in the
fourth section of this article.
Despite the methodology employed to compare and analyse the multistakeholder composition in
each city, three relevant caveats should be made before discussing each business/social model: (i) first,
these business/social models were offered to a group of strategic stakeholders (representing a diverse
set of helixes) in each city as suggestions for their strategic preferences; (ii) second—and this caveat is
the core aspect of the fieldwork research conducted—each stakeholder prioritised strategic preferences
per item presented; and (iii) ultimately, and more importantly, the business/social model resulted in a
collective outcome made by the entire representation of stakeholders. Thus, the results presented in
the fourth section refer to a triangulation methodology based on 25 in-depth interviews with strategic
stakeholders in each city. These interviews were processed collectively through a validation workshop
thereafter, while being contrasted with appropriate desk research throughout the whole data collection
process. Moreover, as it will be observed, the plurality of options was visible in all cases of the
three cities.
The first model proposed is the Direct Public Provision (DPP). This model is the most
straightforward for organising services. For stakeholders, the model can be beneficial in terms
of democratic accountability. Under this model, there is a direct link of responsibility between the
local government and administration, and their citizens for the design to deploy the service [27].
This approach can help, although not guarantee, that citizens’ voices will be considered. By establishing
its own priorities and working directly with citizens, the municipality can ensure that social interests
are not lost to concentrated special and monopolistic interests in the transition to a smart city.
Yet, the challenges of DPP are related to the financial element of the city management model. Budget
restrictions across Europe, especially in southern countries, have made it more difficult for governments
to allocate funds to new smart services [113]. Involving external stakeholders, from private firms
to service users and their communities, in the production of smart services can alleviate some of
the financial burdens. The service provision with external stakeholders also tends to a have greater
innovation capacity than direct delivery because of the wider range of ideas and experience they
provide [114]. There is a clear downside of DPP in this regard, however, as some cities might face more
difficulties than others when directly financing services.
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The second model for service provision that this article suggests is the so-called PPP.
Forrer et al. [27] (p. 476) define PPP as “an ongoing agreement between the government and private
sector organisations in which the private organisation participates in the decision-making and
production of a public good or service that has traditionally been provided by the public sector and
in which the private sector shares the risk of that production.” This definition may differ from the
interpretation made by Mazzucato [32], who debunked PPP myths. Mazzucato is regarded as one of
the most influential modern economists and argues that the public sector should not only be perceived
as a passive corrector of market failure, but also as an entrepreneurial partner with a broader range
of roles in stimulating innovation. Further, Forrer et al.’s definition might be problematic after the
fieldwork action research conducted in the three case studies. The penta-helix somehow makes explicit
the critique related to unforeseen negative social impacts when PPP does not even engage citizens or
peripheral stakeholders in the smart city strategic formulation [43,115]. Therefore, the third and fourth
models are variations of the PPP: triple-helix by including academia, and quadruple-helix by adding
civic society to the triple-helix. The third model is called the Public-Private-Academic Partnership
(PPAP), and the fourth model is called the Public-Private-Academic-People Partnership (4PA).
The PPAP model, as an evolution of the traditional PPP, encourages academic partners not only
to participate in the delivery of services, but also to benefit from the active learning process while
the public and private partners benefit from harnessing the research capacity of the university [116].
PPAP essentially resonates with the triple-helix multistakeholder framework (Table 2). PPAP can offer
increased innovation capacity because universities’ nonprofit orientation and emphasis on knowledge
provide them the ability to explore new ideas that might not be commercially viable yet, but might
eventually be profitable [117]. This model is particularly appropriate for large-scale projects that tend
to involve several governments and consortia of private and academic partners [95]. Further, the model
most likely applies to the ICT sector and smart cities, and particularly to projects like developing an
ICT infrastructure and integrated service platforms for firms and users [17]. The advantage of the
PPAP model is that, by including a larger variety of stakeholders around academia, they might be
more likely to achieve the social acceptability dimension, albeit far from democratic requirements,
such as cases when there is open engagement with communities outside the scientific or business
community, which is not always the common trend. As such, PPAP can otherwise create asymmetric
power relations in which citizens and their communities are either not given any opportunities to
participate in developing scientific solutions (but will, nonetheless, often provide their data) or are
only given the opportunity to provide feedback in an informative fashion at the end of the project, but
not throughout [118]. Such power relations, in turn, can result in scientific solutions that will not be
adopted by citizens or stakeholders for being too far removed from their real needs.
A way to address the previous challenge could be through maximising citizens’ engagement
in the design and delivery of the service provision. This approach is the fourth model called
4PA, which essentially resonates with the quadruple-helix multistakeholder framework (Table 2).
4PA emerges in response to some of the challenges inherent to the traditional PPP model, including
the accountability challenges discussed above. Specifically, PPP has been critiqued for developing a
framework of service or project delivery that overlooks the interests and views of the general public [119].
The 4PA model, in contrast, aims to provide a framework in which mechanisms to aggregate social
concerns are embedded at different stages of the development and delivery process. The civic society
domain overseeing a particular project can, therefore, create opportunities for citizens or particular
stakeholders around the societal challenge to open up an informative process by providing feedback
or getting involved in the project conception and deployment. In smart cities, people living in districts
are clearly these strategic stakeholders whose engagement is crucial for the success of the intervention
that “should be exposed to societal deliberation at an earlier stage in their development” [120] (p. 1).
However, this model is not a panacea for smart cities insofar as conflicts arise if decision-making
processes and deliberation are not accurately prepared with the necessary attention and with mediators
and ambassadors to curate the whole process without influencing it excessively and directly.
Smart Cities 2020, 3 1153
Table 2. Literature Review: Resulting Business/Social Models in Smart Cities.
Resulting Business/Social Models in Smart Cities







Literature Review [27,113,114] [27,32,43,115] [17,116–118] [119] [14,18,34,47–52,60,63,78,121–128]





















• Private sector participating in
the decision-making and
production processes
• Debunk PPP myths
• Other stakeholders excluded
• University benefits from the
learning process
• Large-scale projects fit into this
suitable model
• Social acceptability
• Asymmetric power relations
• Social concerns at different stages
• District level interventions fit into this
suitable model
• May include the communal
ownership of the outcome
• Stakeholders the source
of innovation
• To ensure inter-stakeholder
consensus/conflicts
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By this sequence, this article reaches the fifth and the last model, Urban/Data Commons (U/DC),
in which the fifth helix may emerge consciously or unwittingly through the interactions between
stakeholders and aggregates the necessary agency [34] to facilitate intermediation conditions among
them [63]. This model has more direct citizen and stakeholder engagement (than previous PPAP
and 4PA), also known as co-creation or co-production. Stakeholder engagement is defined as “the
active involvement of end-users and their communities in the various stages of the public service
provision” [121] (p. 1335). However, the concept of the commons (both urban and/or data) includes
the ownership of the outcome beyond the co-created or co-produced involvement of stakeholders in
the decision-making process [122]. Thus, this fifth model essentially resonates with the penta-helix
multistakeholder framework (Table 2), focusing not only on the delivery side of public services and
the initial design process, but also on the ownership of such outcomes being delivered [115,123,124].
Moreover, this model differentiates itself from the 4PA model in how it implies a direct two-way
reciprocal relationship between stakeholders involved in representing the entire range of helixes.
While one best practice of this could be the project developed by the Barcelona City Council called
‘Decidim’ [51,125], by contrast, the absence of any attempt to set up a multistakeholder policy framework
could be clearly spotted in the so-called case of Toronto, Sidewalk Labs, with critics arguing that this
project subverts democracy owing to the monolithic power owned by Google’s parent big-tech firm
Alphabet. This situation raises questions, in the absence of an alternative data commons model, about
who will own the smart city’s infrastructures and platforms and who will control the access to their
services through data ecosystems [14,18,78,115,126].
This fifth business/social model U/DC serves two important purposes. First, individuals
represented through any stakeholder helix can be a source of innovation in the production of city-making
because they contribute unique experiential knowledge of the service that can lead to significant
improvements. Second, this model ensures that the consensus and conflicts of inter-stakeholders are
deeply treated by considering antagonist interests [60], confronted concerns of users, and the whole
democratic dimension of the community-building where citizens´ ownership of the new services
embraces the paradigm of the (urban) commons [127,128]. Particularly, data commons become a
sensitive issue insofar as the digital data could be used to monitor and track citizens with or without
their consent. Thus, smart city interventions that involve the collection and analysis of data also
strongly rely on citizens’ decisions. Since it is citizens’ data that will be collected, cities are facing
pressures to actively engage citizens in their data policy and strategies [51,83].
3. Methodology: Mapping Out the Penta-Helix Multistakeholder Policy Framework
This empirical research compared the multistakeholder policy framework in three follower cities
of the project EU-H2020-SCC-Replicate by employing the penta-helix policy framework. By doing so,
the examination was focused on five strategic dimensions—three on multistakeholder frameworks
and two on resulting business/social models—studied through intensive action research fieldwork
conducted from February 2017 to December 2018 in the three cities. The research revealed key
qualitative observations and mapped out evidence-based empirical results on the five strategic
dimensions studied in each follower city: (i) the composition of stakeholders per helix; (ii) the most
influential stakeholder-helix; (iii) the most proactive stakeholder-helix; (iv) knowledge on the PPP;
and ultimately, (v) the most suitable business/social model (per smart city sector too) in each follower
city. The results were obtained in each city comparatively for the three Replicate follower cities
(www.replicate-project.eu/city2citylearning) based on in-depth interviews with a selected group of
25 strategic stakeholders representing the penta-helix framework through in-depth interviews and
later validated later through a workshop (Table A1 in the Appendix A section) [54]. The five strategic
dimensions inferred from the literature review and the results of the empirical research were used to
build the comparative methodology of the three cases, which addresses the research questions of this
article, presented in the Introduction section.
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3.1. Action Research Fieldwork
The methodology used to apply the penta-helix policy framework included fieldwork research
based on action research. Action research encompasses seven features [129]: (i) it stems from SI, which is
a significant multidisciplinary approach blending scientific research, business administration, public
debate, and ethical controversy [130]; (ii) it unfolds socio-cultural meanings in given territorial contexts
through ethnographic fieldwork research; (iii) it aims at generating practical action for stakeholders’
betterment; (iv) it is based on participatory research processes that are inclusive of plural ways of
knowing in the constitution of theory and practice; (v) it is iterative and heuristic, a continual process of
evolving inquiry and action, by learning from reflections on successes and failures; (vi) it is conducted
by participants/stakeholders for participants/stakeholders, which addresses the fundamental questions
of research; and ultimately, (vii) it is based on democratic ethos, which aims to critique power relations,
address grievances of marginalised groups, and achieve smart city-regional empowerment in the face
of entrenched institutionalised power.
3.2. Research Design: Triangulation
The research design was based on the mixed-method technique of triangulation via action
research (Figure 2), which encompassed (i) desk research (summarised through Tables 1 and 2 on the
conducted literature reviews), (ii) the findings of 75 in-depth interviews with strategic stakeholders
selected by the city representative in each city following the penta-helix framework, and (iii) results
corroborated through three validation workshops, one per each case study city. Comparative case
study research, as defined by Yin [131], was identified as the most effective form of mixed-method
research. This mixed-method process refers to the practical work conducted by the author to gather
evidence-based data through in-depth interviews and validation workshops. The sample consisted
of strategic stakeholders selected by the city representative according to his/her criterion—data is
anonymised in this article to comply with the GDPR and the University of Oxford ethical procedures for
informed consent in fieldwork research (Table A1 in the Appendix A section)—aiming to accomplish
certain methodological foundations to ensure a minimum degree of representation in the sample.
Figure 2. Methodology: Research design based on the mixed-method technique of triangulation via
action research.
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3.3. Data Collection and Analysis
Data collection through action research was arranged iteratively and paralleled two streams of
research while conducting desk research: on one hand, in-depth interviews for the three follower
cities occurred from 25 July 2017 to 25 July 2018. On the other hand, in each follower city, a validation
workshop was conducted on the following dates: 19 September 2017 in Essen, 12 December 2017 in
Lausanne, and 29 May 2018 in Nilüfer.
3.3.1. In-Depth Interviews
Owing to the language barriers of many stakeholders in the three follower cities, a semistructured
15-question questionnaire in English was designed from February 2017 to July 2017 (Table A2 in the
Appendix A section). The data collection started on 25 July 2017 via in-depth interviews being conducted
in parallel in the three cities for one year; data collection ended on 25 July 2018, once 25 strategic
stakeholders were interviewed in each city. The list of interviewees was meticulously designed and
reviewed by each city representative to ensure that the widest level of plurality was reached in their
cities. The strategic stakeholders answered the questionnaire; they were encouraged to validate and
revise their earlier responses in light of the answers of other members of their validation workshop.
3.3.2. Validation Workshops
During the fieldwork research process, three validation workshops (one per follower city) were
scheduled at different intervals of the data collection. The validation workshops, which ensured that
the data collected were not biased or wrongly received, consisted of a selection of 5 five questions
(from the semistructured questionnaire).
It was demonstrated that during this process, disagreement and conflict were shown among a
diverse set of stakeholders. The validation workshop collected these tensions and confrontational
dynamics. The role played by the social entrepreneurs/activists as intermediators in the three cities
(C RING, Impact Hub Ruhr, and Camp Essen in Essen, Germany; Eqlosion, in Lausanne, Switzerland;
and Teracy, Mendireck, and Demir Energy facilitators in Nilüfer) was remarkable during this validation
process. The final scores stemming from the sum of the in-depth interviews were tabulated depending
on the discussion and the re-arrangement suggested among stakeholders. Again, within this validation
process, the role played in clarifying the discussion by those stakeholders who self-identified as fifth
helix was substantial to determine the empirical results presented in Table 3. The fieldwork fixed
25 responses from strategic stakeholders in each follower city as the average threshold to obtain.
The following subsection briefly presents the profile of the three follower cities and the general
composition of stakeholders in each city structured by the penta-helix framework [52].
3.4. Comparing Three Case Studies: Follower City Profile
REPLICATE (REnaissance of PLaces with Innovative Citizenship And TEchnologies) is the name
of the European research and development project that aims to deploy integrated energy, mobility,
and ICT solutions in city districts. The project has a consortium encompassing 38 partners. There
are three lead cities (called lighthouses): San Sebastian (Spain), Florence (Italy), and Bristol (UK)
(Figure 3). The case studies of this article encompassed the cities called followers that aimed to look
into replicating interventions in their cities: Essen (Germany), Lausanne (Switzerland), and Nilüfer
(Turkey).
The City of Essen is located in the North Rhine-Westphalia in the heart of the Ruhr Area,
which encompasses approximately 5.1 million people. Following London and Paris, this metropolitan
area constitutes the third largest urban agglomeration in Europe. Essen is an independent city in
the administrative district of Düsseldorf, and its 582,624 inhabitants make it the ninth largest city in
Germany. Essen has made a transition from a coal and steel metropolis to a European Green Capital.
The municipal area of 210 km per square is divided into 9 districts and 50 neighbourhoods. Further,
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Essen is an important industrial centre for German enterprises and private foundations (E. ON SE,
Stiftung Mercator, and Westnetz GmbH). E. ON SE is an electric utility private company based in
Essen, North Rhine-Westphalia, and it runs one of the world’s largest investor-owned electric utility
science providers. Stiftung Mercator is a private and independent foundation promoting science,
education, and international understanding. And Westnetz GmbH is a private company that serves as
an electricity and gas distribution network operator from its headquarters located in Dortmund beyond
the North Rhine-Westphalia city-region. A combination of big firms, SMEs, and an active craft sector
maintains a good economic climate. The composition of stakeholders and their strategic preferences
resonate with a new and emerging start-up scene integrally involved in mediating among organisations
and projects in Essen (Germany) (Camp-Essen, Impact Hub Ruhr, and Essen 51, among others) [132].
The European Green Capital 2017 project shares a very comprehensive relationship with Essen’s goal
to establish a smart city strategy.
Figure 3. Replicate EU-H2020-SCC project cities: Lighthouses (San Sebastian, Bristol, and Florence) and
Followers (Essen, Lausanne, and Nilüfer). Source: https://replicate-project.eu/city2citylearning/ [54].
During the fieldwork action research process for validation, stakeholders in Essen showed a high
level of interaction, particularly by the three stakeholders representing the fifth helix. The level of
overlap between academia, the private sector, and social entrepreneurs/activists was high as it was
depicted by the strategic project that requires the involvement of several stakeholders having a wide
vision of the city (Figure 4).
Lausanne is the fourth biggest city in Switzerland. It consists of 142,000 inhabitants and is the
centre of an urban area with 350,000 inhabitants. Lausanne’s main firms are Innobridge Service Sàrl,
Tetra Pak, and Logitech. In addition to them, it is worth considering the importance of companies
such as AGEN, CFT, and Landolt, among others. In 2016, Lausanne launched an energy efficiency
programme called Equiwatt, with the objective of saving energy for individuals and businesses,
thereby raising awareness regarding energy consumption. In the mobility sector, Lausanne has been
striving for many years to limit the overwhelming space taken up by private cars to encourage more
access to shops and businesses. By reducing authorised parking times on the streets, the municipality
encourages commuters to leave their vehicles at outlying Park & Ride facilities. The private car
traffic has been reduced by 6000 vehicles per day. Further, the city stakeholders have been working
towards an eco-district called Plaines du Loup, which attempts to promote a public transport axis,
a heat production innovative concept based on deep geothermal and heat recovery from wastewater.
Strategically speaking, though, ICT seems to be a pending subject for Lausanne [133].
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Figure 4. Essen, follower city. Source: https://replicate-project.eu/city2citylearning/ [54].
During the fieldwork action research process for validation, the stakeholders’ interaction was
clearly dominated by the public sector insofar as it is responsible for the flagship project called
Plaines du Loup. However, beyond the widely approved project, clear disagreement existed among
stakeholders in terms of how to implement the given project, which demonstrated a need to keep
opening a democratic consultation channel intermediated by the fifth helix represented by Eqlosion
(Figure 5).
Figure 5. Lausanne, follower city. Source: https://replicate-project.eu/city2citylearning/ [54].
Nilüfer is one of the 17 districts of Bursa Province. Providing logistics connections for major
cities, such as Ankara, İstanbul, and İzmir. Bursa enjoys a key geographic location in Turkey: it is
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in close proximity to national and global markets. There are three universities offering world-class
education. Advanced infrastructure, dynamic entrepreneurs, and a high quality of life and work
create an attractive investment and social climate. Moreover, Nilüfer has been established as the main
residential development area of Bursa to meet housing needs of not only the growing city, but also
industrial and commercial structures. Nilüfer comes first among the districts of Bursa in terms of the
economic contributions while providing employment opportunities to 80% of the Bursa population via
the Organized Industrial Zones within its border. The population increase in the last five years was
35%. This growth is higher than the average of Turkey and Bursa and will probably continue, owing to
the attraction of the city to industrial investment and, thus, the availability of jobs. The population of
Nilüfer encompasses 13.98% of the total population of Bursa (2,842,547). Bursa is viewed as one of the
fast-growing middle-weight provinces projected to account for more than 60% of global GDP growth
over the next 15 years. There are 16 organised industrial zones and a free-trade zone with clusters
in automotive, textile, machinery, food, and furniture. The multistakeholder framework focused on
grassroots empowerment through neighbourhood committees and energy co-operatives. The private
sector is leading a strong transformation through industry 4.0 and spin-off ecologies [134].
During the fieldwork action research process for validation, the level of participation was
remarkably outstanding, which showed the strong deliberative ethos that the city possesses. Particularly,
the role played by social entrepreneurs/activists (including Teracity, Mendirek, and Demir Energi
facilitation intermediaries) was crucial to spark and guide a constructive debate, particularly when the
debate around the understanding of PPP arose in Nilüfer (Turkey) (Figure 6).
Figure 6. Nilüfer, follower city. Source: https://replicate-project.eu/city2citylearning/ [54].
4. Results, Discussion, and Analysis: Comparing Three Follower Cities in H2020-SCC-
Replicate Project
This article argues that applying the penta-helix multistakeholder framework, albeit adapted
to the unique context of urban governance, can support the city councils of the follower cities to
manage their own update transitions towards a more democratic smart city approach. The penta-helix
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framework is intimately connected with the logic of the city business/social models insofar as it
provides an understanding of the stakeholder composition while essentially serving as a policy tool for
city governments to articulate the smart city strategy.
To operationalise the penta-helix, the fieldwork action research was conducted by triangulating
desk research, in-depth interviews, and validation workshops (Figure 2), assisted by a questionnaire
encompassing five strategic dimensions (Appendix A, Table A2).
4.1. Five Strategic Dimensions
The penta-helix framework was conducted by systematising five strategic dimensions through
the questionnaire in which each person individually responded to and later validated collectively
the following aspects: (i) which helix each stakeholder belonged to (composition), (ii) which was
the most influential helix (influence), and (iii) which was the most proactive helix (proactivity).
Moreover, regarding the suitability of the resulting business/social models (DPP, PPP, PPAP, 4PA,
and U/DC), each person responded to (iv) whether the person knew the meaning of PPP and (v) which
business/model was the most suitable in general and as per the smart sector (energy, mobility, and ICT)
(Table 3).
Table 3. Empirical results.
1. Penta-Helix Multistakeholder Policy Framework
% Essen Lausanne Nilüfer Global
1st Strategic Dimension: Composition
1. Public 52 36 20 36
2. Private 12 12 32 18
3. Academia 16 24 20 20
4. Civic society 8 16 12 12
5. Social E/A 12 12 16 14
TOTAL 100 100 100 100
2nd Strategic Dimension: Influence
1. Public 28 80 44 50
2. Private 44 12 28 28
3. Academia 8 0 12 7
4. Civic society 0 8 16 8
5. Social E/A 20 0 0 7
TOTAL 100 100 100 100
3rd Strategic Dimension: Proactivity
1. Public 16 21 24 20
2. Private 21 22 23 22
3. Academia 21 21 16 19
4. Civic society 22 16 21 20
5. Social E/A 19 20 16 19
Total 100 100 100 100
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Table 3. Cont.
1. Penta-Helix Multistakeholder Policy Framework
% Essen Lausanne Nilüfer Global
2. Resulting Business/Social Model
4th Strategic Dimension: Knowledge about PPP
1. Yes 92 60 76 76
2. Maybe 4 40 12 20
3. No 4 0 12 4
Total 100 100 100 100
5th Strategic Dimension: Business/Social Models Suitability
1. DPP 18 17 15 17
2. PPP 21 23 21 22
3. PPAP 20 23 21 21
4. 4PA 19 19 21 19
5. U/DC 22 18 22 21
Total 100 100 100 100
Energy
1. DPP 12 34 16 21
2. PPP 36 6 28 23
3. PPAP 16 20 40 25
4. 4PA 20 20 4 15
5. U/DC 16 20 12 16
Total 100 100 100 100
Mobility
1. DPP 24 20 20 21
2. PPP 24 34 28 29
3. PPAP 4 13 16 11
4. 4PA 28 20 16 21
5. U/DC 20 13 20 18
Total 100 100 100 100
ICT
1. DPP 8 20 0 9
2. PPP 28 27 27 28
3. PPAP 24 27 52 34
4. 4PA 8 13 13 11
5. U/DC 32 13 8 18
Total 100 100 100 100
4.2. Empirical Results
Regarding the first strategic dimension, amid the global picture of the three follower cities,
the most represented helix was the public sector. However, it is remarkable that the profiles of
stakeholders following this hegemonic helix, respectively, are academia, the private sector, social
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entrepreneurs and activists, and civic society. Strikingly, though, the composition in the three follower
cities varies considerably: while Essen and Lausanne (with a strong academic presence) were highly
represented by people from the public sector, Nilüfer was represented by the private sector, owing to
the great interest in developing a new economic model for the metropolitan area as a consequence of
the demographic boost. However, in the three cases, it could be highlighted the regular presence of
stakeholders representing the fifth helix, which this article refers to as intermediaries (the detailed
classification is shown in Table A1 in the Appendix A section).
Examining the second strategic dimension, the fieldwork enquired about the most influential
helix and found that, globally, the public sector still overcomes the private influence. However,
from case to case, the most influential helix varies: Lausanne overwhelmingly (and consistently with
its current publicly owned flagship district intervention, Plaines du Loup) selected the public sector
and underscored academia as the most represented helix in the composition of its framework, which
entirely contrasts the results obtained in the other two follower cities. In Essen, the strategic alliance
between the private and the social entrepreneurial/activist appears to be the most influential helix
with strong public support. On the other hand, in Nilüfer, owing to the institutional boundaries and
politically fragile situation, the triad between the public-private-civic society still appears to influence
the multistakeholder policy framework.
The third strategic dimension related to the level of proactivity in each helix per city illustrates a
rather regular picture with almost similar distribution in each city per helix (between 16–24%). In line
with the rationale of this article, the fifth helix reveals itself as part of the ecosystem of proactive
stakeholders in the three follower cities. Case by case, in Essen, it seems inspiring and hopeful that the
leading proactive role of the civic society contrasts with the low level of influence provided to this
helix. Similarly, in Lausanne, the proactivity level observed in the private sector differs from the low
level of influence regarding this helix. Ultimately, in Nilüfer, the public sector seems to be leading in
both its level of influence and proactivity.
After examining the three strategic dimensions related to the multistakeholder framework
regarding composition, influence, and proactivity, the fieldwork focused on the resulting business/social
models. Notably, the fourth dimension asking about the understanding of the PPP sparked a deep
discussion in the validation workshops of the three follower cities, which in itself demonstrates the
openness of stakeholders in the three cities to go beyond, or at least question, the internal arrangements
of the PPP. Furthermore, responding to the two intertwined research questions of this article, the debate
in the validation workshop invited further exploration of how SI can occur through intermediating
smart city initiatives among stakeholders by establishing ad hoc business/social models. This aspect
was responded to operationally through the fifth strategic dimension.
The fourth strategic dimension entirely focused on the knowledge of PPP. Despite the expected
affirmative answer being a generic answer, the level of debate in the validation workshops among
stakeholders, particularly in Lausanne and Nilüfer, explains and illustrates the doubts, as many
responded with Maybe and directly with No: while 40% in Lausanne responded with Maybe, and 12% in
Nilüfer opted for No. These findings clearly reveal that PPP could have entirely different interpretations
and positions, which contrast the idea of it being the only business/social model in the multistakeholder
framework, as this article elucidates.
Ultimately, the fifth strategic dimension depicts an interesting comparative result for each city,
despite that the most suitable model (not the only one, though), generically speaking, was the PPP.
Lausanne predominantly and collectively selected PPP and PPAP, but Essen and Nilüfer appeared to
show an experimental strategic willingness when selecting U/DC. A reason that could explain these
results is the openness and willingness for a further experimental approach, insofar as cities seemed to
embrace further complex business/social models that result in interdependencies among stakeholders
and the related decision-making processes. From the current DPP in Lausanne, stakeholders clearly
and collectively pointed out PPP and PPAP as a suitable step forward. In the case of Essen, the alliance
between the private sector and the entrepreneurial ecosystem presumably derives to a model with
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intermediaries, bricoleurs, assemblers, and brokers for transforming the regional economic model
as a whole, supported by a strong public sector. Finally, Nilüfer, being dependent on the current
DPP model but with resilient leadership in the public sector, may be keen to further explore PPP,
PPAP, and even 4PA by gradually including social innovators in their transformational processes,
as is the case with the strategic endeavour of the city council of Nilüfer to establish the Centre for
Social Innovation. More detailed information about the stakeholders in each city can be found in the
Appendix A, Table A1.
However, the suitability of business/social models clearly differs from city to city when focusing
on specific sectors, which clearly validates the rationale of this article suggesting going beyond the PPP
hegemonic model. The debate on the validation workshop was conducted through specific initiatives
and projects related to ongoing implementations in the energy, mobility, and ICT sectors. The detailed
analysis of such interventions goes beyond the scope of this article. Nonetheless, the emergency of a
plethora of actions subject to be openly discussed among a wide range of stakeholders clearly indicates
the potential of the variation of such models for a democratic deliberation in smart cities.
As such, starting with energy, follower cities selected their current position as the most suitable
one. In Lausanne, the model on DPP for the district heating fits consistently with the flagship project
Plaines du Loup and apparently well into the expectations of the stakeholders. In Essen, PPP appears
to work so far, due to the ongoing collaboration among the municipality and the local corporation (E.
ON SE), by paving a path for 4PA with the potential proactive role of academia and civic society. In
Nilüfer, PPAP appears to be the suitable option as a result of several ongoing energy co-operatives
jointly established with the university.
Considering mobility, another different business and social rationale from the perspective of
stakeholders determines the strategic selection: the PPP model for Lausanne and Nilüfer, while 4PA is
the most suitable model for Essen. According to the stakeholders’ validation workshop, Lausanne shows
great dependency on its DPP model in the city. The next step to revert this logic was the PPP, yet simply
as an evolution on the business/social model of the city for this sector. Consequently, Lausanne aspires
to include further involvement of stakeholders, as Eqlosion attempted in the workshop, by establishing
further links and interactions. In Nilüfer, the situation was a bit more divided: the lack of sustainable
mobility demands clearly signal a shift towards a PPP model, although several key stakeholders
could see the potential of U/DC as well, insofar as an informal, socially-rooted, and highly-networked
transport system called dolmuş—share taxis—works efficiently [135]. This informal mobility system
would require a sharing economy platform based on data commons to enhance its socio-economic
impact on the metropolitan area of Bursa. Essen was already implementing several mobility systems
integrating citizens through parking and public transport apps.
Finally, in the ICT sector, Essen chose U/DC, whereas Lausanne and Nilüfer preferred PPP and
PPAP, respectively. This sector witnessed the marginal selection of the DPP, acknowledging a weak
potential to absorb the investment in data governance and regulation, while Essen embraced new
initiatives on data commons (U/DC) as a way to take the lead in the post-GDPR context instead.
Lausanne admitted its clear weakness in this field, and Nilüfer demonstrated its preliminary smart city
platform project led by the university.
5. Conclusions
This article aimed to shed light on the helix frameworks from the SI perspective by extending the
triple- and quadruple-helix frameworks through suggesting an evidence-based ex-novo framework
called penta-helix, which has been comparatively operationalised in three case studies. Based on
the penta-helix framework, this article showed the following for each case study: (i) a unique
multistakeholder composition, degree of influence, and proactivity per helix; (ii) a diverse set of
strategic preferences on business/social models per smart city sector; and (iii) a constant presence of
the fifth helix as intermediaries, by concluding that (iv) there is a willingness among stakeholders to
increasingly experiment with additional diverse democratic arrangements (beyond the PPP).
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Although extant literature on the European model of smart cities presents a detailed illustration
of the multistakeholder policy frameworks [120], there has been little research to compare the helix
frameworks and even less evidence-based data on analysing the stakeholders’ compositions and
strategic preferences in specific urban contexts. One of the major reasons for the lack of evidence might
be the hegemonic assumptions around the self-referential PPP model. Considering the newness of
opening up towards a wider approach, it can be assumed the consequences for this absence of rich
approaches, which could be seen in the way the term stakeholder adopts a vacuum and apolitical
significance [42]. This does not reflect the reality full of complex and intertwined interactions among
stakeholders. In addition, it underestimates the agency and the transformational role that several
stakeholders pervasively may take by germinating SI as an iterative joint multistakeholder process.
Therefore, smart cities by themselves do not necessarily lead to greater democracy, as envisaged by
advocates of the term long ago, but rather to a potential risk for generalising pervasive forms of
algorithmic extractivism and surveillance capitalism [11], whose substantial aim are to monetise all
bits of citizens’ lives. Building on this, this article—by comparing three cities—provided evidence for
demonstrating how their multistakeholder composition brings about a diverse set of strategic priorities
resulting in different business/social models.
The literature review of the helix multistakeholder framework, and the resulting business/social
models, helped in discussing various selected dimensions, which then opened up avenues to raise
further findings that can inform future empirical research on this topic. In the prospects of future
research addressing democratic legitimacy-related questions smart cities face, this article shed light on a
further nuanced empirical demonstration regarding the penta-helix framework playing a role in creating
less technocratic smart cities. The penta-helix thus represents in itself a methodological innovation
with social added value by acknowledging that each city or region may present a different democratic
context in which stakeholders operate and interact in relatively unique terms [1,54,110]. Apart from
addressing the research questions, this article encourages scholars to follow the methodological
rationale that was suggested by taking up comparative case study research that highlights novel
analytical practices carried out in the broad SCC H2020 European framework bringing together no less
than 93 European smart cities, which, in itself, is an opportunity to further explore the research questions
elucidated. Especially, when a field is in the emergent stage, case studies offer rich comparative
understanding and allow researchers to adopt exploratory approaches to describe novel frameworks
like the suggested penta-helix.
In summary, this article, acknowledging the preliminary exploratory findings stemming from this
intensive fieldwork action research study conducted in three European cities encourages critical scholars
working in the SI field to engage in applied research pertaining to democratic smart city-building
through the penta-helix framework. Consequently, the private sector, the public sector, academia, and
civic society can come together—assisted by the fifth helix, intermediaries, social entrepreneurs, or/and
activists, who can have the capacity to enhance the plurality towards a democratic smart city—and fulfil
ambitions of a wide multiplicity of stakeholders who co-exist and act in the city. The research questions
established in this article serve as a trigger for a much-needed push in influencing the H2020-SCC
policy framework programme in augmenting the role that SI—stemming from the renowned European
social market economy approach—plays in smart cities. Other researchers can actively reuse this
research to match the growing contribution that SI makes at the grassroots level in building democratic
smart cities in Europe [110].
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Appendix A
Table A1. Details of direct sources: Fieldwork action research through in-depth interviews and validation workshops from February 2017 to December 2018.
Composition of Organisations Represented by the 75 Anonymised Strategic Stakeholders (25 Per Follower City)













• Stadt Essen (5)
• Handwerkskammer Düsseldorf
• Stadtwerke Essen AG
• Amt für Stadtplanung und Bauordnung
• Office for the environment
• EMG - Essen Marketing GmbH
• EnergieAgentur.NRW
• EWG (2)
• INNOGI: Westnetz GmbH
• Stiftung Mercator
• E. ON SE
• Centre for Logistics and Traffic,
Universität Duisburg-Essen
• Institute of urban development + urban design
• Institute for Advanced Study in the Humanities
(KWI Essen)
• Gas- und Wärme-Institut Essen e.V.
• VeloCityRuhr
• Lokalfieber e.V.
• C RING (Smart City
Technology Startup)














• SiL (Lausanne Utilities) (2)
• Service Organisation et Informatique (3)
• Services Industriels (2)
• Sustainable Development (2)






• University of Applied Sciences Western
Switzerland (HES-SO / hepia)













• Bursa Eskişehir Bilecik
Development Agency
• Nilüfer City Council (3)
• Bursa Metropolitan Municipality
• Informa Akademi
• Kuark Dijital (2)
• Mendirek
• Teracity R&D and
Software Center
• Uludağ Electric Distribution
Incorporated Company
• Enervis Energy Service Inc.
• BQS
• Uludağ University Technology Transfer Office (3)
• Software technologies and transfer (2)
• Union of Chambers of Turkish
Engineers and Architects




• Mendirek spin-offs and facilitation
• Demir Energi facilitation
intermediaries (2)
Note: The allocation of the strategic stakeholders in each helix was directly made through a self-identification of them and through the filtering of the city representative. This study
directly reflects this allocation made at the city level by the main active participants of the fieldwork action research process that took place from February 2017 to December 2018.












• Prefer not to say
• Other




(6) NAME OF YOUR INSTITUTION OR ORGANISATION
(7) ROLE IN YOUR ORGANISATION
B. RETHINKING MULTISTAKEHOLDER HELIX FRAMEWORK (8–11)
In this section, we will kindly ask you to answer to your question about the institutions/organizations
operating in your (follower) city. Remember that the answers will be anonymised:
(8) COMPOSITION (1st STRATEGIC DIMENSION)
Could you please select the stakeholder group that you consider you belong to in the context of your
(follower) city? (You can select more than one, if this is the case.)
1. Public sector: Local, regional, national authorities, and/or related institutions
2. Private sector: Firms, companies, and corporations
3. Academia: Science, technology, and knowledge centre (any discipline)
4. Civic Society: NGO, associations, civic groups (any kind of formal civic group)
5. Social Entrepreneurs/Activists/Bricoleurs/Assemblers working directly/indirectly with other
stakeholders groups (in any kind of informal network)
(9) INFLUENCE (2nd STRATEGIC DIMENSION)






(10) PROACTIVITY (3rd STRATEGIC DIMENSION)









(11) Could you please detail which organisation are you referring to? Name the institution/organisation, please.
C. RESULTING BUSINESS/SOCIAL MODELS (12–15)
(12) KNOWLEDGE ABOUT PPP (4th STRATEGIC DIMENSION)
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Table A2. Cont.
C. RESULTING BUSINESS/SOCIAL MODELS (12–15)
(13) Could you explain what do you understand as Public Private Partnership (PPP) with your own
words, please?
(14) MOST SUITABLE BUSINESS/SOCIAL MODEL (5th STRATEGIC DIMENSION)
Could you rate the following types of business models’ suitability level for your (follower) city,
in your opinion?
• Direct Public Provision (DPP)
• Public Private Partnerships (PPP)
• Public Private Academic Partnerships (PPAP)
• Public Private Academic People Partnerships (4PA)
• Urban/Data Commons (U/DC)
Not at all
It could be explored further
Definitely
(15) BY SECTORS
Could you please select the most suitable business/social model for each smart sector in your
(follower) city?
• Direct Public Provision (DPP)
• Public Private Partnerships (PPP)
• Public Private Academic Partnerships (PPAP)
• Public Private Academic People Partnerships (4PA)
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